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Note
Steering for More Trouble? Could the Ruling in
United States v. American Express Co. Lead to
Further Antitrust Enforcement Actions in
Europe?
Michael Srodoski
I.

INTRODUCTION

American Express contractually prohibits its merchant
customers from making efforts to display a preference for any
credit card other than American Express. This policy, known as
anti-steering, was challenged under § 1 of the Sherman Act1 by
the United States and seventeen states2 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.3 On
February 19, 2015, the court found for the United States and coplaintiffs, holding that the anti-steering policies used by
American Express were anti-competitive.4
As a multi-national short-term credit entity with an annual
transactional capacity of over one trillion dollars, American
Express is one of the largest companies in the United States.5
United States v. American Express Co. addressed antitrust
issues in a rather complicated two-sided market.6 This decision
may therefore serve as a blueprint for future liability around the

Juris Doctor Student, 2016, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A.,
State University of New York at Albany, 2001.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014).
2. The Attorneys General of Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Ohio, Texas, Illinois, Tennessee, Montana, Nebraska, Idaho,
Vermont, Utah, Arizona, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire were co-plaintiffs.
3. Before the Honorable Nicholas G. Garaufis, United States District
Judge.
4. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
5. American Express is comfortably within the Fortune 100, coming in at
number ninety and eighty-eight respectively in 2014 and 2015. See Fortune 500,
FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (for the
2014 list; click dropdown menu and select 2014).
6. See infra note 17.
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globe and escalating damages for American Express and its
stockholders.
This Comment seeks to examine the American Express
decision and determine what, if any, further enforcement action
American Express might face in the European Union (EU).
Section I will briefly analyze American Express as a company
and define the process of anti-steering. It will then turn to the
current state of non-price vertical restraint antitrust law in the
United States under the § 1 of the Sherman Act. Section II
summarizes the Eastern District of New York’s decision in
American Express. Section III then projects how this case would
likely be judged in the EU based on current vertical restraints
guidance from the European Commission, and assesses
potential antitrust liability for American Express. As a result,
this Comment concludes that American Express faces a serious
risk of further antitrust enforcement actions in the EU as a
result of the decision in American Express.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AMERICAN EXPRESS, THE GENERAL PURPOSE CREDIT AND
CHARGE CARD INDUSTRY, AND THE PRACTICE OF ANTISTEERING
American Express is not only one of the three largest credit
card companies in the world,7 handling more than $1 trillion in
transactions over its card network annually,8 it is one of the
largest companies of any kind in the United States.9 Following
annual net revenues of over $34 billion, American Express
delivered profits of approximately $6 billion.10 Greater than half

7. While Visa is the undisputed leader in market share of both credit cards
and bank cards, American Express and MasterCard have market shares that
are very similar. Each has occupied the number two and three spots in the credit
card market at various points in the past five years. American Express has no
bank card presence. E.g., Odysseas Papadimitriou, Market Share by Credit
Card Network, CARDHUB, http://www.cardhub.com/edu/market-share-bycredit-card-network/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
8. American Express Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2015) at 2,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4962/000119312515059931/d862737d1
0k.htm [hereinafter Amex 10-K].
9. See FORTUNE, supra note 5.
10. American Express Co., Annual Report to Shareholders at 1, http
://ir.americanexpress.com/file.aspx?iid=102700&fid=1500069225 [hereinafter
Shareholder Report].
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of this company’s basic and business cards are issued to holders
outside the U.S.11 Of their billed business, about 33% originated
from outside the U.S,12 and billed business is essential to
American Express.13 Unlike its main rivals, American Express
derives most of its revenues from customer spending.14
The traditional general purpose credit and charge (GPCC)
card industry business is built around a credit card.15 It consists
of an “open loop” five participant two-sided market16: lenders
and customers on one side, acquirers and merchants on the
other, and a network like Visa or MasterCard in the middle.17
Visa partners with lenders to issue cards with a Visa logo to
consumers on one side of the market, and Visa partners with
acquirers who negotiate with merchants to accept cards with a
Visa logo on the other.18 The lenders take most of the interest
income (and all of the customer default risk), the acquirers take
most of the discount fees charged to merchants, and as the
network access provider, Visa earns its money on a pertransaction basis.19 American Express’ business model differs in
both the type of card and the number of players. American
Express operates a “closed loop” three participant two-sided
market: customers on one side, merchants on the other, and
11. Id. at 25.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. FORBES, infra note 20.
15. A credit card is one with a spending limit that allows a balance to be
carried from month to month with no penalty other than charged interest. A
charge card, however, typically has no limit and requires the customer to pay
the full balance every month or pay interest plus a penalty. E.g., Credit Cards
vs. Charge Cards–What is the Difference?, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.
com/crediteducation/questions/charge_cards.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
16. A two-sided market is one in which a single business brings together
two sets of customers by serving each individually. For example, a newspaper
sells advertising space to businesses, and sells newspapers to readers,
delivering the advertising to the reader. Internet giants Facebook and Google
operate in two-sided markets. For a deeper analysis of two-sided markets, see
David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided
Platform Businesses (Coase-Sandor. Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No.
623, 2012).
17. Trefis Team, How Has Visa Achieved Double Digit Growth and is it
Sustainable?, TREFIS (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.trefis.com/stock/v/articles/
229673/how-has-visa-achieved-double-digit-growth-and-is-it-sustainable/201403-06.
18. Id.
19. Id. (noting that as of 2008, this fee was $0.08 per transaction and as of
2013, there were 2.2 billion Visa cards in circulation, with an average of 27
transactions annually per card).
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American Express in the middle.20 The vast majority of
American Express cards are cards issued by American Express
to affluent individuals, and as such, there is far less interest to
be collected on balances carried from month to month.21 Instead
American Express’ income is derived mostly from the discount
rate charged to merchants, which are a percentage of overall
spent, instead of a flat rate.22
Steering is a practice that is very common in the business
world.23 Since the discount rate American Express charges is
higher than Visa, MasterCard, or Discover,24 merchants have a
financial incentive to steer customers away from American
Express. Due to their business model, however, American
Express has the ability to negotiate directly with merchants25
and a strong incentive to drive large transaction volumes
through their network.26 Including boilerplate anti-steering
clauses in their contracts with merchants is a way for American
Express to prevent transaction volume from being steered away
from American Express’ network and into another form of
payment.27 These Non-Discrimination Provisions (NDPs), as
American Express calls them,28 prevent merchants from
displaying any preference for type of payment and from
providing customers with information about how much the
merchant is paying in fees.29 Though the U.S. government itself
20. Trefis Team, How American Express Gains a Competitive Advantage
from Its Closed-Loop Network, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/03/13/how-american-express-gains-acompetitive-advantage-from-its-closed-loop-network/.
21. Id. (explaining that issuing cards to affluent individuals limits the
number of cards in circulation (American Express has 107 million while Visa
has 2 billion), limits the rate of delinquency (American Express is at 1.07% and
the national commercial banks rate is 2.39%), and positively impacts the
amount per transaction (American Express average is $150 while Visa is $50)).
22. Id. (noting that 65% of American Express revenues are from discount
rate fees charged to merchants).
23. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (highlighting typical methods of steering, including ‘buy one get one free’
coupons, discounts on clearance merchandise, and the placement of a particular
product at eye level and another on the bottom shelf).
24. Jacob Davidson, AmEx’s Battle with the Feds Could Mean Lower Costs
for Credit-Card Users, TIME (July 7, 2014), http://time.com/money/2962417/
amexs-battle-with-the-feds-visa-mastercard-credit-card/.
25. FORBES, supra note 20.
26. See FORBES, supra note 20.
27. FORBES, supra note 20.
28. See Amex 10-K, supra note 8, at 80.
29. Am. Express Co., 83 F. Supp. 3d at 161, 163–64 (noting that American
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uses anti-steering mechanisms to protect customers from
questionable lending tactics in the home mortgage industry,30 it
views American Express’ NDPs as anti-competitive non-price
vertical restraints.
B. NON-PRICE VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER THE RULE OF
REASON
The Sherman Act of 1890 prohibits the formation of any
contract that restrains trade.31 Read literally, the Act potentially
renders all contracts invalid.32 However, very early in the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court identified that the
Sherman Act was not intended to infringe upon “normal and
lawful contracts or agreements.”33 In adopting an approach that
aligned the Sherman Act with the settled common law, the Court
in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States34 created what is
now called the rule of reason as a means for analyzing whether
a contract unreasonably restrains trade.35
Since 1911, analysis under this rule has evolved into a
three-pronged approach, depending on the nature of the offense.
Some agreements “will so often prove so harmful to competition
and so rarely prove justified that the antitrust laws do not
require proof that an agreement of that kind is, in fact anticompetitive.”36 These agreements are said to be illegal per se.37
Other agreements must be examined more closely.38 A reviewing
Express began vigorously enforcing these provisions in the early 1990s as a
direct result of lost business from Visa’s successful “We Prefer Visa” campaign).
30. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.40 (2011).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared illegal.”).
32. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence.”).
33. 221 U.S. 1, 81 (1911).
34. Id. at 59–60.
35. Id.; see also United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911).
36. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc. 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998).
37. See, e.g., Klor’s v. Broadway-Hales Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 210–11 (1959)
(affirming concerted refusals to deal as illegal per se); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (“Under the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal per se.”).
38. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238 (“The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
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court will use the rule of reason approach to analyze the specific
facts “of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition.”39 Between these two
approaches lies a third category of analysis, where conduct is not
immediately determined to be illegal, but it is also not given the
in-depth analysis of the rule of reason, instead receiving a ‘quicklook’ analysis.40
Most non-price vertical restrictions pertain to market
divisions, which restrain inter-brand competition (competition
between sellers of the same brand), but promote intra-brand
competition (competition between different brands).41 For a
time, non-price vertical restraints were held to be illegal per se.42
However, a change in economic thinking toward promoting
intra-brand competition gained traction in the Supreme Court,
43 and the per se invalidity of non-price vertical restraints was
overruled.44 Non-price vertical restraints are now judged under
the rule of reason.45
To navigate rule of reason cases, courts have devised
analytical frameworks. Before any analysis of the merits can
begin, the relevant market must be established.46 There is no
set-in-stone way to define a market. The U.S. government has
issued guidance on how to expand and contract the market
borders to ensure true competitors are captured within the
market, but non-competitors are left out.47 Several factors may
be considered. An obvious factor is geography.48 While parties
certainly do dispute the geographic boundaries of a market,49 it
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.”).
39. Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (citation
omitted).
40. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (acknowledging
the existence of the quick look analysis, without employing it).
41. 1-19 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 19.01 (2d ed. 2015).
42. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
43. Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 54–56.
44. Id. at 57 (overruling the per se rule set forth in Arnold, Schwinn & Co.).
45. Id.
46. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(showing that rule of reason analysis requires “an inquiry into market power
and market structure designed to assess the combination’s actual effect.”).
47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 4.2 (2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
48. Id. at § 4.1.
49. See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 332
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is generally the most straightforward factor. Another factor is
the type of product (or service); but this factor must be expanded
to include all reasonable substitutes for the exact product/service
at issue.50 Finally, guidance also focuses on finding the
narrowest subset of the larger market where a monopolist, if one
hypothetically existed in that subset,51 could raise its prices by
a small, but significant, amount without losing enough sales to
make the price change unprofitable.52
Once the relevant market is established, the court may
proceed to the merits. Initially, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving a cognizable antitrust injury.53 To prove this, the
plaintiff first must show the defendant possessed market
power.54 Market power has been defined as the “power to control
prices or exclude competition.”55 It may be proven theoretically,
through market share56 or market dynamics analysis,57 or
directly, by providing evidence of actual anti-competitive
(1961) (discussing the dispute as to whether the market was Florida, Florida
and Georgia, or the entire eastern market served by coal mined in the
Appalachian region).
50. An economist would call this cross-price elasticity of demand. See Mike
Moffatt, Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand, ABOUT, http://economics.about.
com/cs/micfrohelp/a/cross_price_d.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). The Supreme
Court relies on the plainer term of “reasonable interchangeability.” United
States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
51. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at § 4.1.1.
52. Id. at § 4.1.2.
53. K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129
(2d Cir. 1995).
54. Some circuits make a showing of market power a prerequisite to
recovery. See General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744
F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984). Others, including the Second Circuit (where
American Express was heard), only require a showing of market power if actual
effects cannot be demonstrated. See K.M.B Warehouse Distrib., 61 F.3d at 129.
55. Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391.
56. There is no hard and fast rule as to how much market share is enough
to exhibit market power. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 314 (1949) (deeming 16% of the relevant market a “substantial share”) with
Tampa Electric Co., 365 U.S. at 332 (deeming 1% of the relevant market not
substantial). However, market share need not reach the level of monopoly for a
party to have market power. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504
U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (“Monopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, something
greater than market power under § 1.”).
57. See Int’l Distribution Ctr, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 792
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Among these characteristics are the strength of the competition,
the probable development of the industry, the barriers to entry, the nature of
the anti-competitive conduct and the elasticity of consumer demand.”). Market
concentration is also a factor to be considered. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 47, at § 5.
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conduct that demonstrates market power.58 This direct evidence
must show an anti-competitive effect on the market as a whole,
not simply on the plaintiff.59 Further, anti-competitive effects on
intra-brand competition must be weighed against procompetitive effects on inter-brand competition before conduct
will be considered anti-competitive as a whole.60
If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant is given the
opportunity to provide pro-competitive justification for its
conduct.61 The Supreme Court has foreclosed some justifications,
including the argument that competition in this particular
market is in and of itself unnecessary or unwise.62 Other
arguments, like prevention of economic free riding, are much
more likely to be accepted. 63 If the defendant cannot provide an
adequate pro-competitive justification, the conduct is considered
anti-competitive and the analysis is complete.64 If the defendant
provides an adequate pro-competitive justification, the plaintiff
then must show that there exists an alternative way for the
defendant to achieve the pro-competitive goals used to justify the
conduct that caused the antitrust injury.65
Despite what would seem to be a rigid and formalistic
approach, antitrust inquiries remain highly functional in
nature. Every market is different, and the facts of each market
and situation will necessarily have significant impact on the

58. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61
(1986) (“‘[P]roof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,’ can
obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for
detrimental effects.’” (quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 429
(1986)).
59. Antitrust laws protect “competition, not competitors.” Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis added).
60. Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 54–56 (1977).
61. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 483.
62. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)
(“The Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable.”).
63. Inter alia, free riding describes the effect of one firm sharing the benefit
of another firm’s capital expenditures without sharing the costs. See Leegin
Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–91 (2007) (discussing
the pro-competitive justifications for preventing free riding and providing
examples).
64. Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
65. Id.
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analysis.66 As courts struggle with antitrust inquiries,67 it is
ironic that for all of the developments in antitrust law over the
past ninety-five years, the primary inquiry remains today as it
did in 1918: “whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”68
III. UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.
As the federal district court readily acknowledged at the
outset, this case entailed a very complicated antitrust inquiry.69
The GPCC Card business is a highly sophisticated industry
consisting of several key players operating distinct business
models70 in a two-sided market.71 The court immediately
expressed frustration that it has been put in the position of
deciding the issue,72 given its relative lack of expertise.73
At the end of this analysis, the court arrives at five
significant conclusions.74 First, the NDPs at issue were properly
classified as non-price vertical restraints, and therefore subject
to analysis under the rule of reason. Second, though the GPCC
market was indeed two-sided in nature, the appropriate market
66. Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (“Under [the rule of
reason], the fact-finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition.”).
67. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs.,
996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993).
68. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
69. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 149 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
70. Id. at 156–60 (discussing the differences between the “spend-centric”
model of American Express and the “lend-centric” models of Visa and
MasterCard).
71. Id. at 154–56 (discussing the two-sided nature of the GPCC industry
and the difficulty measuring the effects of conduct in one market when the
effects of that conduct are often felt in the other market). The particularities of
the two-sided market of the GPCC industry also contribute to high barriers of
entry. “The only reason that a merchant wants to use a payment product is that
a customer wants to use the product and purchase some good or service from
the merchant” and vice-versa. Id. at 156. (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
72. Id. at 151 (“[T]he court has repeatedly urged the parties in this case to
negotiate a mutually agreeable settlement.”).
73. Indeed, due in large part to extensive explanation of the intricacies of
the GPCC industry and how American Express’ conduct effects that industry,
the decision checks in at a robust 276 pages.
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for analysis was the merchant side of the market, and the
market did not properly include debit and other bank cards.
Third, the court established American Express possessed
market power within the GPCC market. Fourth, the plaintiffs
demonstrated that the NDPs had resulted in actual and concrete
harms to the GPCC industry by removing price sensitivity
within the merchant market, leading to higher prices for
merchants, which were in turn passed on to consumers. Finally,
the court determined that American Express’ pro-competitive
justifications were neither legally cognizable, nor sufficiently
supported by the record. Each will be examined in turn.
A. NDPS AS VERTICAL NON-PRICE RESTRAINTS
The court accepted that NDPs do not “neatly fit into the
standard taxonomy of federal antitrust law.”75 Most vertical nonprice restraints seek to restrain intra-brand competition in an
effort to foster more robust intra-brand competition.76 The court
concluded that while the NDPs have some elements of tying
arrangements or exclusive dealing contracts,77 NDPs did not fit
neatly in those categories either.78 Despite the functional truth
that merchants have no real choice in whether to accept the
contractual provisions or not,79 they remain agreements between
“firms at different levels of production—namely, between the
network and its merchant-customers” and are therefore most
properly classified as vertical non-price restraints.80 As such,
NDPs are subject to analysis under the rule of reason.81
B. THE MERCHANT SIDE OF THE GPCC INDUSTRY AS THE
RELEVANT MARKET—DEBIT CARDS EXCLUDED
Before

engaging

in

the

three-step

burden-shifting

75. Id. at 168.
76. See id. at 61. See also Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 889–91 (2007).
77. NDPs are contracts of adhesion, where the vast majority of merchants
have no room to negotiate. They must agree or they cannot accept American
Express cards. See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp.3d at 163.
78. Id. at 168.
79. Id. at 192 (explaining how American Express cardholders’ insistence on
using their cards puts merchants in an “all-or-nothing” position).
80. Id. at 168.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
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framework applicable under the rule of reason,82 a reviewing
court must first determine the relevant market.83 The
geographic market was established as the territorial United
States by agreement of the parties.84 This stipulation left only
the relevant product market to be determined. The principle
disagreements among the parties concerning the product market
were two-fold. First, the parties differed on whether the market
was transactional in nature; that is, whether it included both the
customer and merchant sides of the market.85 The second
disagreement was whether to include debit and bank cards,
which naturally depended on the resolution of the first
question.86
American Express urged the court to accept the relevant
market definition of “transactions, rather than network
services.”87 This would effectively “collapse all services provided
to merchants and cardholders in the context of the GPCC card
platform into a single antitrust market.”88 The court rejected
this argument, finding that “this takes the concept of twosidedness too far. The goal in defining a relevant product market
is not to obfuscate or confuse market realities, but rather to
‘recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists.’”89 By
refusing to collapse the two-sided market into a single market,90
the court rejected the argument that, since American Express
chooses to structure its business as a closed loop, the relevant
analysis should be performed as if all competitors also used a
closed loop.91 The court concluded that the relevant product
82. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 168–69.
83. “[T]he court must first determine the contours of the relevant antitrust
market and thereby define an appropriate context for the remainder of the
analysis.” Id. at 170.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 173.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 170 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326
(1962)).
90. The Supreme Court has previously refused to collapse a two-sided
market into a single market for the purposes of antitrust analysis. See TimesPicayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610 (1953) (“[E]very
newspaper is a dual trader in separate though interdependent markets; it sells
the paper’s news and advertising content to its readers; in effect that readership
is in turn sold to the buyers of advertising space. This case concerns solely one
of these markets.”).
91. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 173. (“That American Express has
elected to compete at each of these levels by partially integrating into the
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market is network services provided to merchants, which is in
fact independent of the market for customers.92
American Express also argued that, although previous
GPCC antitrust cases declined to do so,93 the court should
expand the relevant product market to include debit and bank
cards.94 The main thrust of this proposition was that bank cards
have taken on increased significance and now account for a much
larger percentage of the total transactions than they did when
previous cases were decided.95 The court declined to accept this
argument, leaning on the cross-elasticity of demand testimony96
and the competitive realities of the GPCC market.97 The court
acknowledged that American Express showed the ability to
make several small, but substantial non-transitory increases in
price (SSNIP) within the GPCC card market,98 and therefore
saw no reason to include debit cards in the market. Finally,
“there is no indication that the merchants—the ‘relevant
customer’ for defining the relevant product market in this case—
historically have been or would be inclined to switch to debit
network services” or if such substitution did occur “would be
sufficient to temper an exercise of market power therein.”99

issuing and acquiring businesses does not compel the court to collapse these
distinct markets into a single ‘transactions’ market to more closely resemble
Amex’s chosen business strategy.”).
92. Id. at 174.
93. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003).
94. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
95. Id.
96. The court leaned heavily on the expert testimony of the Government’s
economist, Dr. Katz, who testified, inter alia, that because merchants were not
sensitive to discount price changes, a small but significant non-transitory
increase in price (SSNIP) could be profitably maintained by a hypothetical
monopolist within the GPCC card industry, exclusive of the debit card industry.
Id. at 176–79. The court also noted that until this lawsuit was filed, American
Express communicated, in its year-end statements to shareholders, that it did
not consider itself to be a competitor with debit and bank cards. Id. at 176 n.14.
97. The court also placed heavy weight on the testimony of American
Express’ own executives that indicated American Express did not base its rates
on the debit card rates of its competitors in any significant way, and testimony
of merchants who do not view debit cards a viable alternative to GPCC cards,
when choosing that option means turning away customers who prefer to pay
with GPCC cards. Id. at 180–84.
98. SSNIP is a criteria used by the Department of Justice in evaluating
market size. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 10–11. The court discussed
these price increases in further detail when evaluating market power. See Am.
Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 182–83.
99. Id. at 176.
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C. MARKET POWER
The court then discussed whether American Express
possessed market power in the GPCC industry. At the outset,
the court noted the highly concentrated nature of the GPCC
industry,100 and the strong barriers to entry.101 The strength of
this barrier was described as the “chicken and egg problem”: no
customer wanted to carry a form of payment unless a large
percentage of merchants would accept it, and no merchant
wanted to accept a form of payment unless a large percentage of
customers carried it.102 Thus, in order for a new company to
enter the GPCC card industry, it would need to build a network
of customers and merchants simultaneously,103 which is very
difficult to achieve. Since Discover entered the market in 1985,
there have been no entrants,104 and Discover has not had great
success gaining market share from Visa, MasterCard, or
American Express.105 Combined with the highly concentrated
nature of the market and high barriers to entry, the court found
that the 26.4% share of the GPCC market possessed by
American Express was sufficient to “suggest that the firm
possesses market power.”106 Yet, “market share alone likely
would not suffice to prove market power” without something
more.107
In searching for this factor, the court took an odd turn. It
found that the loyalty of customers holding American Express
cards—dubbed cardholder insistence—is demonstrable evidence
of market power. The court noted that American Express has
taken steps to incentivize cardholders to use their cards by
100. The court adopted, by reference, a finding that the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) for the GPCC industry is over the threshold for a highly
concentrated market. Id. at 189. The HHI measures the concentration of a
market by adding the squares of the market shares of its participants. See
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 18–19.
101. This market has “high barriers to entry, which further reduce the
likelihood that an attempt at anti-competitive conduct would be defeated by
new suppliers entering the market.” Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d. at 189–
90.
102. Id. at 190.
103. Id.
104. The court noted that the only reason Discover was able to enter the
market was because it was initially owned by Sears, which marketed the cards
to holders of Sears cards. Id. at 190 n.24.
105. Discover only has 5.3% of the GPCC market. Id. at 188.
106. Id. at 190.
107. Id.
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providing “robust rewards programs,”108 and recounts stories of
retailers and gas stations that lost significant business when
deciding to no longer accept American Express.109
This line of reasoning is suspect since it implicitly penalizes
American Express on the merchant side of the market for its
success on the customer side of the market. It is well established
that market power in a § 1 Sherman Act case is a lower standard
than monopoly power in a § 2 analysis.110 Yet, possession of
monopoly power may be defended on the grounds that it is “a
consequence of a superior product.”111 If American Express has
created a product that is so superior to its competitors that
customers will change their shopping habits to only shop where
that product is accepted, it does not follow that American
Express should be penalized for its success. The court also
focused on the way American Express uses the information
gained from its customers to market its network to merchants.112
This reasoning sounds remarkably like market power derived
from “business acumen,” another affirmative defense to
possession of monopoly power.113 Were these the primary
grounds upon which the court rested its finding of market power,
the decision as a whole would be subject to a more intense
criticism. However, the pricing policies of American Express
provide ample direct evidence of market power.
Over a six-year period beginning in 2005 and ending at the
filing of this suit, American Express “repeatedly and profitably
raised its discount rates to millions of merchants across the
United States as a part of its Value Recapture . . . initiative
without losing a single large merchant and losing relatively few
small merchants.”114 The court counted over twenty different
industry-specific price hikes in the relevant time period, with
rates in some industries hiking more than once.115 The airline
industry, for example, experienced as much as a 15% increase in
discount rate with no merchant attrition.116 Testimony from
108. Id. at 191–92.
109. Id. at 194.
110. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992)
(“Monopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, something greater than market
power under § 1.”).
111. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
112. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 193–94.
113. 384 U.S. at 571.
114. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195.
115. Id. at 196.
116. Id. at 196.
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major merchant executives showed that despite price increases,
they had no realistic option to drop American Express.117 This
evidence was sufficient to establish market power directly.118
D. ACTUAL HARM TO COMPETITION
In the absence of NDP agreements, merchants would have
an incentive to influence customers to use other less costly forms
of payment.119 Other members of the GPCC industry could
compete on price, jockeying to be the preferred destination of a
merchant’s steering efforts.120 As a result, merchants would save
money.121 Part of those savings would be passed onto customers
in the form of lower prices.122 The NDP agreements remove the
ability of merchants to steer, and this removes the incentives for
firms in the GPCC industry to compete on price.123 In practice,
the NDPs act to create and reinforce a price floor—a minimum
price all GPCC industry firms may charge merchants without
fear of a competitor undercutting that price.124 While this
reasoning is formalistic and theoretical at best, it is also the only
option available.
Realistically, while there is evidence that firms in the GPCC
industry currently do not compete on price,125 there is also no
concrete evidence that steering in the GPCC works—aside from
a successful Visa advertising campaign over twenty years ago.126
The court’s own reasoning cuts against the success of steering.
If American Express cardholders are insistent upon using their
cards, what real effect will steering have? Also, there is no
concrete evidence provided to show that if discount rates fall as
a result of removing NDPs, merchants will pass those savings
onto customers by lowering prices. Yet, as the court addresses in
117. Id. at 192–93, nn.26–27.
118. Id. at 207–08. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (“‘[P]roof of actual detrimental effects, such as a
reduction of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power,
which is but a ‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”) (quoting 7 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511, at 429 (1986)).
119. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 209.
120. Id. at 210.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 210–11.
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greater detail when evaluating the pro-competitive justifications
raised by American Express, it must assume competition will
take place. The hallmark of the Sherman Act is competition,127
and it is not for the court,128 nor any single firm,129 to decide
when competition is proper and when it is not.130
E. AMERICAN EXPRESS’ PRO-COMPETITION REASONING
American Express has two primary pro-competitive
justifications. First, the company claims that NDPs protect their
differentiated business model, and the success of American
Express in the GPCC industry increases overall competition in
the card issuing market.131 Second, the NDPs prevent merchants
from free riding on American Express’ investments into
cardholder value propositions.132 Judge Garaufis concluded that
the first justification is not legally cognizable,133 while the
second justification does not excuse the anti-competitive nature
of the NDPs.134
While American Express is likely correct that the NDPs are
beneficial to the continued success of the closed loop model, and
that the continued success of American Express enables greater
competition in the card issuing market, the Supreme Court has
foreclosed both of these arguments in the past. The intent of the
Sherman Act is to protect competition, not competitors.135 A
company cannot shield itself from the competition of the market
by entering into anti-competitive agreements.136 Further, anticompetitive conduct in one industry or market cannot be
defended by pro-competitive benefits in another industry or
127. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)
(referring to the Sherman Act as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise”);
Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of
our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.”).
128. Nat’l Soc. of Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695–96 (1978)
(“The judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against . . . harm by
conferring monopoly privileges on . . . manufacturers.”).
129. Id. at 695 (refusing to allow the Society to “impose[] [its] views of the
costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace”).
130. Id. at 696 (“In sum, the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based
on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”).
131. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 226–27.
132. Id. at 226.
133. Id. at 227.
134. Id. at 238.
135. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
136. Id.
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market.137 This eviscerates American Express’ argument that
benefits to customers on one side of the market outweigh harms
to merchants on the other.
Preventing economic free riding is generally an acceptable
and strong pro-competitive defense for otherwise anticompetitive vertical agreements.138 The court agreed,139 but
questioned the logical foundation of American Express’
arguments.140 American Express argued that it must prevent
free riding because if merchants steer customers away from
American Express, those merchants will benefit from the costly
market-based analytics American Express is uniquely able to
produce due to their closed loop system without having to pay
for those services through merchant discount fees.141
The court challenged this argument, noting that the record
indicates that American Express charges some merchants for
these analytics.142 “American Express’s ability to separately
price and sell the data-analytics services it claims are
susceptible to free-riding . . . leads the court to conclude that the
network possesses equally effective and significantly less
restrictive means of preventing this form of free-riding.”143
American Express also contended that merchants will reap the
rewards of the time and expense put into American Express’
robust cardholder benefits programs and direct marketing,
without having to pay (again through merchant discount fees)
for that access.144 The court acknowledged that this was a
potential issue, however, and questioned the frequency with
which American Express’ advertising drives customers’
purchasing decisions, rather than customers’ predetermined
desire for the products or services provided by the merchant.145
137. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“[Competition]
cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain
private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater
competition in a more important sector of the economy.”).
138. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
889–91 (2007) (discussing the pro-competitive justifications for preventing freeriding in vertical agreements generally); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing the pro-competitive
justifications for preventing free-riding in exclusive dealing agreements).
139. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 234–35.
140. Id. at 235–36.
141. Id. at 235.
142. Id. at 236.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 237.
145. Id. at 237–38.
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Ultimately, District Judge Garaufis found that the procompetitive merits of American Express’ various free riding
arguments did not outweigh the anti-competitive effects of
NDPs.146
IV. PROBABLE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR
AMERICAN EXPRESS
In the European Union, antitrust law is laid out in Articles
101–102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. Article 101 concerns anti-competitive agreements
between two or more parties,147 while Article 102 concerns anticompetitive conduct by a single party possessing a dominant
position in the relevant market.148 The European Commission is
charged with application of treaty principles.149 Enforcement
opinions issued by the Commission based on violations are
interpreted by decisions of the General Court, and may in some
instances be further appealed to the European Court of
Justice.150 The Commission publishes guidelines summarizing
case law and provides interpretive guidance so companies may
structure their agreements and conduct to avoid antitrust
violations.151 An examination of the guidelines pertaining to
Article 101 and vertical restraints leads to the conclusion that
American Express would be decided similarly if tried under EU
law.
A. THE RELEVANT MARKET
According to the Commission’s guidelines, “[t]he objective of
defining a market in both its product and geographic dimension
is to identify those actual competitors of the undertakings
involved that are capable of constraining the undertakings’
behaviour and of preventing them from behaving independently
of effective competitive pressure.”152 Although this language is
146. Id. at 238.
147. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 101, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
148. TFEU art. 102.
149. TFEU art. 105(1).
150. TFEU art. 256.
151. Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, SEC (2010) 411
[hereinafter Vertical Restraints Guidelines].
152. Commission Notice 97/C 372/03, ¶ 2, 1997 O.J. (C 372/5) [hereinafter
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not identical to that used by the court in American Express, the
foundational underpinnings are analogous: “recognize
competition where, in fact, competition exists.”153 Assuming that
the geographic market is not in dispute, the product market
would likely be found to be the GPCC card market, as it was in
American Express.154
The guidelines define the relevant product market as that
which “comprises all those products and/or services which are
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the
consumer.”155 This language tracks closely to the reasonable
interchangeability language identified by the Supreme Court in
United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.156 The
guidelines identify demand substitutability (the ability of
customers to easily switch between products) as the “most
immediate and effective disciplinary force on the suppliers of a
given product, in particular in relation to their pricing
decisions.”157 In this respect, the guidelines advise the use of
cross-price elasticity of demand when defining the boundaries of
the product market,158 which the American Express court
followed.159 The guidelines also indicate that the ability of a
hypothetical monopolist to make small but significant nontransitory increases in price without losing profits would point
toward a proper market determination.160 Though the guidelines
do not use the SSNIP acronym, this formulation is the exact
same formulation advised by the Department of Justice
Horizontal Merger Guidelines,161 and relied on by Judge
Garaufis in American Express.162 Finally, the guidelines instruct
that the Commission often contacts “customers and competitors
of the companies involved, to gather their views on the

Market Guidelines]. This notice is incorporated into the Vertical Restraints
Guidelines by reference. Vertical Restraints Guidelines ¶ 86.
153. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 172 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
154. Id. at 10.
155. Market Guidelines ¶ 7.
156. 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
157. Market Guidelines ¶ 13.
158. Id. ¶ 39.
159. 351 U.S. at 380–81.
160. Market Guidelines ¶¶ 15–17.
161. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § 4.1.2.
162. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 176–77 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
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boundaries of the product market.”163 Likewise, the American
Express court placed heavy weight on the testimony of those
within the GPCC card market and among merchants that debit
cards are not suitable substitute products.164 The similarities
between the Commission’s guidance and the reasoning adopted
in American Express leads to the conclusion that the relevant
product market determination inquiry would conclude similarly,
with debit cards not included in this market.
B. BLOCK EXEMPTIONS AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Article 101 creates a statutory analytical framework that is
similar to the American common law burden-shifting framework
used in American Express.165 Article 101(1) prohibits all
agreements between undertakings that restrict or distort
competition.166 Article 101(3) carves out a safe harbor for any
agreement that “contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit.”167 Article 101(3)(a) limits the safe harbor to those
agreements that do not “impose on the undertakings concerned
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives.”168 This structure imposes a burden first on the
Commission to determine that the conduct is anti-competitive.
Next, the parties to the agreement may show that the agreement
meets the safe harbor provision, in other words, that the
agreement is justified by the pro-competitive benefits it
provides. Finally, the Commission may determine the anticompetitive restrictions imposed by the agreement are not
“indispensible” to the objectives contemplated by the parties,
which is an analogue to imposing a burden of showing that there
is a method for accomplishing the goals of the agreement that
has lesser anti-competitive effects. This framework tracks
closely the methodology used in American Express,169 and any
resulting gaps are filled in by the Commission’s “block
exemption” regulations for the application of the safe harbor
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Market Guidelines ¶ 40.
See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151.
Id. at 64–67.
TFEU art. 101(1).
Id. at art. 101(3).
Id.
88 F. Supp. 3d at 168–70.
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provision.170
Block exemptions allow for large categories of agreements
to be considered exempt from Article 101 liability.171 The
Vertical Restraints Guidelines lay out those agreements that do
not fall within the purview of Article 101, and therefore do not
require exemptions. Article 101 does not cover de minimis
agreements, which are those considered to be of minor
importance.172 The guidelines also identify agency agreements,
which are those between a principal and her agent, despite the
fact that they may be different undertakings, as not covered by
Article 101.173 Any other vertical agreement that would
otherwise violate Article 101 must therefore comply with the
block exemption regulations to be permissible. The block
exemption for vertical agreements applies to two or more
undertakings, at different levels of the distribution chain,
operating in either tacit or implied agreement, based on the
purchasing or resale of certain goods or services.174
The Commission has acknowledged that vertical
agreements may have substantial pro-competitive effects,175 in
the same way as the federal district court in American
Express.176 In order to assess the probability of pro-competitive
effects outweighing anti-competitive effects, Commission
regulations require a determination of the market power of the
undertakings involved in the agreement.177 These regulations
set a standard that anything less than 30% market share by each
of the undertakings will make an agreement between them

170. Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 Apr. 2010 on the Application of
Art. 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 2010 O.J. (L 102/1)
art. 2(1) [hereinafter Block Exemption Regulations].
171. Id. ¶ 2.
172. Vertical Restraints Guidelines ¶¶ 8–11. See also Commission Notice on
Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict
Competition Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 2001 O.J. (C 368), ¶¶ 7–9.
173. Vertical Restraints Guidelines ¶¶ 12–21. Similarly, subcontracting
agreements are also exempt. Id. ¶ 22.
174. Id. ¶ 25. This language tracks closely the logic used by the American
Express court in determining that the NDP agreements were in fact vertical
restraints. See 88 F. Supp. 3d at 149–52.
175. Block Exemption Regulations ¶ 6 (“Certain types of vertical agreements
can improve economic efficiency within a chain of production or distribution by
facilitating better coordination between the participating undertakings.”).
176. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 234–35.
177. Id. ¶ 7.
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presumptively pro-competitive.178 Thus, because American
Express only had 26.4% of the GPCC card market,179 the NDP
agreements would be presumptively pro-competitive. However,
the regulations also restrict the application of the block
exemption for vertical restraints to only those undertakings with
annual revenues under €50M (~$56M).180 With annual revenues
of $34 billion, American Express does not qualify for a block
exemption.181 Therefore, the restraints must be considered on
the merits.
C. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS OUTSIDE OF BLOCK RESTRICTIONS
As a threshold matter, the guidelines advise that the
Commission will evaluate the competitive nature of the
agreement in light of how the relevant market would operate if
the agreement did not exist.182 This tracks closely to how the
U.S. Supreme Court has mandated that American courts should
analyze similar agreements.183 The Commission will look to
actual events as well as hypothetical events,184 and the effect or
likely effect on prices and output will be examined.185 The court
in American Express examined actual anti-competitive effects,186
specifically focusing on the effects on price.187 The Commission
also will look for evidence of market power, which it defines
almost exactly as American courts do: “Market power is the
ability to maintain prices above competitive levels or to maintain
output in terms of product quantities, product quality and
variety or innovation below competitive levels for a not
178. Id. at art. 3(1).
179. 88 F. Supp. 3d at 188.
180. Block Exemption Regulations art. 2(2).
181. See Shareholder Report, supra note 10, at 24.
182. Vertical Restraints Guidelines ¶ 97.
183. Cf. Nat’l Soc. of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695–96
(1978) (“The judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against . . . harm by
conferring monopoly privileges on the manufacturers.”).
184. Vertical Restraints Guidelines ¶ 97 (“In the assessment of individual
cases, the Commission will take, as appropriate, both actual and likely effects
into account.”).
185. Id. (“For vertical agreements to be restrictive of competition by effect
they must affect actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the
relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation, or the variety or
quality of goods and services can be expected . . . .”).
186. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 168–69 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
187. Id.
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insignificant period of time.”188 As under the Sherman Act, the
market power requirement for a 101 violation is less than that
required for a finding of dominant position under 102.189 The
Commission has also stated it will examine barriers to entry190—
in the same way as American Express.191 Whether the agreement
is imposed or agreed will also have relevance,192 as it did in
American Express.193 With the Commission analyzing largely
the same factors, and in light of proposed regulation by the
Commission prohibiting NPDs,194 the Commission is likely to
come to the same conclusion—NPD agreements are anticompetitive in nature, and for them to stand, American Express
must offer some substantial pro-competitive justification.
D. PRO-COMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS UNDER 101(3)
Article 101 allows otherwise anti-competitive agreements to
be permitted if the agreements have overriding pro-competitive
justifications.195 The Commission has laid out a four-factor test
for judging possible pro-competitive benefits.196 First, the
agreement must lead to efficiencies in production or
development of the goods or services in question.197 As in
American antitrust analysis, efficiencies gained in one market
cannot offset anti-competitive injury to another market.198

188. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra note 151, ¶ 97; see also United
States v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (defining
monopoly power as the power to control prices or exclude competition).
189. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra note 151, ¶ 97; see also Am.
Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 189–90.
190. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra note 151, ¶¶ 111, 117.
191. See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 189–90.
192. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra note 151, ¶ 121.
193. See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 163–64.
194. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Interchange Fees for Card-Based Payment Transactions,
at art. 11, COM (2013) 550 final (July 7, 2013) (“Any rule in licensing
agreements, scheme rules applied by payment card schemes and in agreements
entered into between card acquiring payment services providers and payees
preventing payees from steering consumers to the use of any payment
instrument preferred by the payee shall be prohibited.”).
195. Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of
the Treaty 2004/C 101/08 (EU) No. 101/97 of 27 Apr. 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 101),
¶ 33 [hereinafter 101(3) Guidelines].
196. Id. ¶ 34.
197. Id. ¶ 34(a).
198. Id. ¶ 43.
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Second, consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits.199
Third, the restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment
of the objectives.200 Finally, the agreement cannot eliminate
competition in respect to a substantial part of competition of the
products in question.201 All four prongs must be met for an
agreement to be adjudged pro-competitive.202
Whether an otherwise restrictive agreement produces
efficiencies within the market is analyzed from an objective
standpoint.203 The Commission has identified several types of
efficiencies, but notes that they must be directly caused by the
agreement.204 Cost efficiencies are recognizable, provided they
lead to innovation,205 synergies from the combination of
assets,206 economies of scale,207 economies of scope,208 or better
production planning.209 NDPs provide none of these to the GPCC
card market.
Customers, in terms of 101(3) analysis, are the direct or
indirect users of the product.210 As the product in question is
network services in the GPCC card market, the relevant
consumer is the merchant charged the discount rate. Merchants
can be said to receive a fair share of the benefits if they receive
benefits that “at least compensate [them] for any actual or likely
negative impact caused to them by the restriction of
competition.”211 The net effect must be at least neutral.212 Thus,
the greater the harm to competition, the greater the benefit to
merchants must be to offset it.213 Since it can be argued that the
merchants receive no benefit from the NDPs, this prong is not
met.
Restrictions from the agreement are indispensable if both
the agreement in whole and the individual restrictions are
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. ¶ 34(b).
Id. ¶ 34(c).
Id. ¶ 34(d).
Id. ¶ 42.
Id. ¶ 49.
Id. ¶ 54.
Id. ¶ 64.
Id. ¶ 65.
Id. ¶ 66.
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 68.
Id. ¶ 84.
Id. ¶ 85.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 90–91.
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“reasonably necessary in order to achieve the efficiencies.”214 As
noted above, there appear to be no efficiencies gained by the
GPCC card market as a whole from American Express’ NDP
agreements. Additionally, the Commission points out that the
pro-competitive effects must be felt by the market as a whole,
not by one specific competitor who is party to the agreement.215
This is analogous to the maxim in American antitrust law that
antitrust laws protect “competition, not competitors.”216
As the court in American Express pointed out, the strongest
of the pro-competitive justifications offered by American Express
could be achieved without anti-competitive effect by instituting
a program where American Express sells the analytics created
by its closed loop system to all customers.217 It seems plausible
that there would exist a similar ability to sell those services to
merchants in the EU. The existence of a less restrictive
alternative to the NDPs ensures the agreement would not meet
the third prong of the test.
Whether an agreement eliminates a substantial amount of
competition in a market is a context-specific inquiry where both
actual and potential competition must be considered.218 The
level of competition existing both before and after the agreement
is to be taken into account.219 Of specific importance are barriers
to entry, including the burden of sunk costs, the response of
market incumbents to new entry, and past entry on a significant
scale or the absence thereof.220 The court in American Express
addressed all of these factors at some point in its opinion. It
found that competition on price existed on some level before the
NDPs, and on almost no level after.221 The court found that sunk
costs for a new entrant to the GPCC card market were
significant,222 that incumbents were likely to be hostile,223 and
that there had been no significant entry into the market since

214.
215.
216.
added).
217.
2015).
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. ¶¶ 73–74.
Id. ¶ 49.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 236 (E.D.N.Y.
101(3) Guidelines, supra note 195, ¶ 108.
Id. ¶ 107.
Id. ¶ 115.
Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151.
See id. at 189.
See id.
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1985.224 These findings support a conclusion that a substantial
amount of competition in the GPCC card market is foreclosed by
NDP agreements.
Consequently, NDP agreements objectively produce no
substantial efficiencies in the GPCC card market. Merchants
receive none of the benefits and agreement restrictions likely
have alternatives with fewer anti-competitive effects. NDPs also
further restrict competition in a market in which there was little
competition to start. With every indicator pointing against procompetitive justification, it is therefore likely that the
Commission will not allow NDP agreements to be protected by
the 101(3) safe harbor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The European Commission has issued extensive guidelines
so that companies may structure their agreements to avoid
antitrust liability. Those guidelines mirror, in many respects,
the bedrock principles of American antitrust law applied by the
federal district court in American Express. The method of
analyzing vertical restraints implemented by the court in this
case is likely to be very similar to the analysis implemented by
the Commission. Considering the overall strength of the
reasoning displayed in the American Express opinion and the
lack of any specific provision unique to EU antitrust law
permitting NDP agreements to stand, American Express faces
the very real possibility of future antitrust liability in the EU.

224. Id. at 190.

